

Civic Life and Democratic Citizenship in Qatar: Findings from the First Qatar World Values Survey

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Abstract

For decades, Western democracy promotion efforts have tended to focus on strengthening civil society and stimulating civic engagement as methods of encouraging the emergence of a democratic political culture. This is nowhere more true than in the Arab world. Between 1991 and 2001, some \$150 million dollars—more than half of all U.S. funding for democracy-promotion in the Middle East—went toward this goal. Yet new public opinion data from the first-ever Qatar World Values Survey (QWVS), administered in December 2010 by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) of Qatar University, calls into question this presumed relationship between civic participation and democratic culture. This is because, in fact, civic participation in Qatar is actually associated not only with reduced support for democracy itself, but also with a disproportionate lack of those values and behaviors thought to be essential to it, including confidence in government institutions and social tolerance. In Qatar, the QWVS reveals, civic participation cannot lead individuals toward a greater appreciation for democracy, for it is precisely those who least value democracy that tend to be most actively engaged in civil society.

The QWVS asked respondents about various norms and behaviors said to be important in begetting or sustaining democratic political institutions, including about social tolerance, political interest, appreciation for democracy, confidence in government institutions, and participation in civil society organizations. Contrary to the assumptions of present Mideast democratization efforts, however, it found that civil society participation does not lead individuals toward a greater appreciation for democracy, nor toward a democratic political culture. Instead, male and female Qataris who channel their social, economic, and political ambitions through participation in civic associations are disproportionately likely to be less tolerant of others, less oriented toward democracy, and less confident in formal governmental institutions. These findings are the result of a careful multivariate statistical analysis, which offers a strong foundation for inferring, albeit not proving, causality. Thus, overall, it seems clear that associational life in Qatar does not seem to be an incubator of democracy.

Civic Life and Democratic Citizenship in Qatar

Findings from the First Qatar World Values Survey

The series of pro-democracy revolutions and uprisings that have brought much of the Arab world to a standstill since January 2011 invites renewed interest in the role of ordinary citizens in influencing political outcomes in the region and around the globe. From Morocco to Yemen, the nebulous collective known simply as “the people” (*“al-sha‘ab”*) has taken to the streets to demand increased accountability, fundamental reform, and, in what has become a universal rallying call, *“isqāṭ al-nithām”*—“the fall of the regime.” In so doing, these ordinary citizens have seemingly revealed themselves to be much better democrats than is typically assumed of peoples of the region, long deemed synonymous with authoritarian governments, and with populations who by their very values and attitudes are willing to tolerate them.

Yet, for all this, the sudden and still ongoing popular political mobilization transfixing the Arab world poses as many questions as it answers about the nature and structure of citizen orientations related to democracy and governance. Not least among these difficulties is the observation that one group of states in particular seems to have been specially immune from the regional turmoil. With the exception of Bahrain, where politics overlaps with longstanding ethno-religious divisions, the Arab Gulf as a distinct category of nations has conspicuously avoided the fate of neighboring societies, a fact that begs the question: why? Are Gulf Arabs simply less inclined toward democratic political orientations than are, say, Egyptians? If so, what is it about the unique social, economic, and political institutions in the Arab Gulf that serves to mediate the formation there of a democratic political culture?

Under the backdrop of the wave of popular protests and revolutions that have gripped much of the Middle East and North Africa since the beginning of 2011, the present study examines the one Arab nation that has remained perhaps least affected by this regional upheaval, the tiny Gulf state of Qatar. Using previously-unavailable data from the inaugural

Qatar World Values Survey administered in December 2010, we explore the political orientations of ordinary Qatari citizens, these being of considerable interest on at least two separate accounts. First, owing to a lack of requisite data, extant empirical studies of political culture in the Arab world have largely been forced to omit from their analyses an entire class of state, namely the resource-rich monarchies of the Arab Gulf, of which Qatar represents the archetypical example. Thus, inasmuch as one might expect citizen attitudes regarding democracy and governance to be shaped by the unique set of social, economic, and political institutions that distinguish this corner of the Arab world, the Qatar data unlock not merely an additional case for study but a whole new genus.

The second reason Qatari political orientations demand interest is that, beyond filling a serious typological void, they also may help explain the country's—and to a lesser extent the Gulf region's—relative immunity from the sort of popular political pressures that continue to challenge Arab regimes elsewhere. This is because, as will be seen shortly, Qataris' norms and behaviors do not relate in the expected ways to their attitudes about democracy. In particular, one critical element said to work toward the formation and maintenance of a democratic political culture—citizen participation in civil society organizations—is shown instead to evidence a more complicated individual-level relationship between the values and behaviors common to democracy on the one hand, and actual support for democratic political institutions on the other. In Qatar, civic participation does not lead individuals toward a greater appreciation for democracy, for it is precisely those who least value democracy that tend to be most actively engaged.

The Meaning of Civic Engagement

Since the publishing of Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* in 1963, research on democracy and democratization has continued to recognize the role of political culture—the values and behavioral patterns of ordinary citizens—in begetting (e.g., Huntington 1993) or sustaining (e.g., Schmitter and Karl 1993; Rose 1997) democratic political institutions. Among the norms and behaviors said to reflect a uniquely “democratic” political culture are respect for gender equality (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; United Nations Development Programme 2006); tolerance of diversity (Gibson 1995, 1996, 1998; Garcia-Rivera *et al.* 2002); inter-personal trust (Putnam 2002; Rose *et al.* 2008); and political interest and knowledge (Verba *et al.* 1995; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Delli Carpini 2000). A final component, and one supposed to

hold special significance in encouraging democracy, is citizen participation in private civic associations, groups and relationships that together are said to constitute a polity's larger civil society mediating the connection between citizen and state. Indeed, students of democracy as far back as Tocqueville have pointed to the multifarious ways in which civil society promotes more responsive and more liberal governments: as recently summarized by Jamal (2007, 1), they "help to hold states accountable, represent citizen interests, channel and mediate mass concerns, bolster an environment of pluralism and trust, and socialize members to the behavior required for successful democracies."

Not only are these benefits of civil society emphasized in the scholarly literature on democracy and democratization, moreover, but the notion that civic engagement leads to more democratic citizenship also plays a decisive role in shaping Western policy toward developing countries, those of the Arab world not least among them. Hawthorne (2005) tells that in the decade between 1991 and 2001 some \$150 million dollars—more than half of all U.S. funding for democracy-promotion in the Middle East—"went to projects classified as civil society strengthening" (quoted in Jamal 2007, 1). Thus the question of whether or to what extent participation in associational life is indeed linked to more democratic political orientations among ordinary Arab citizens is not merely an academic matter.

Yet it is a debated one. Studying the role of civil society in promoting democracy in Palestine, Amaney Jamal (2007) argues that this relationship is not unidirectional but circular, that the structure of and lessons learned from civic participation will depend on a society's existing political framework and thus are more likely to reinforce the status quo than alter it. This implies that the salutary effects of civic participation observed in democracies do not necessarily translate to non-democratic contexts. In places where democracy does not exist to begin with, says Jamal, private associations can just as easily operate in support of the regime—and indeed their survivability is linked precisely to the extent they do so—than in support of the behaviors and attitudes thought to generate democratic citizens. In sum, she says, "[w]here associational contexts are dominated by patron-client tendencies, associations, too, become sites for the replication of those vertical ties" (3).

Jamal's findings, as noted, are based primarily on observations of associational life in Palestine. But if there is one context that would provide an even more fitting test of her thesis about the conditional relationship between civic participation and democratic political orientations, it is doubtless the rent-based Arab Gulf, where the state's principal role is exactly

this, the top-down distribution of revenues generated from the sale of natural resources (Mahdavi 1970; Beblawi 1978). And even of these *rentier* states, Qatar, with its miniscule size and population, vast income from oil and natural gas exports, and relatively homogeneous citizenry, is arguably the most perfect case. In Qatar as elsewhere in the region, the ruling tribe *qua* government serves by definition as ultimate patron to every citizen, either directly through employment or political access or indirectly, as Jamal describes (15), via “secondary and tertiary patrons [that] are directly linked back to the state.” Moreover, with every eight out of ten residents of Qatar being a foreign ex-patriot or migrant laborer, Qatar’s citizen population of no more than 300,000 tends to be inward-looking and to seek opportunities to be connected to one another and to the regime, making private, exclusive civic associations a natural locus of clientelist networks.

Given this specific institutional character of Qatar and the other Arab Gulf regimes, one would expect that their civic organizations should take on social and political functions much nearer to those witnessed in Jamal’s Palestine than in Tocqueville’s America. They should represent traditional, non-democratic forms of involvement: opportunities to build broader societal connections, to have a life outside the home, but not opportunities to learn about and experience democratic politics and/or to mobilize support for particular policies. These associations are attractive to individuals who have political interest but choose not to channel it into genuine political activity because they either do not support or do not understand what actual democracy involves and, in any case, lack the confidence in the prevailing political system to believe that real political change is even an option. In sum, these associations supply social involvement and connections for persons who have broader interests but whose values and judgments do not lead them to think about politics in terms of democracy.

Implicit also in this redefinition is that civic life in the region is unlikely to assume another of the roles ascribed it in the democratization literature: a vehicle for the promotion of social tolerance. Contrary to the assumption that societal involvement works to cultivate more open-minded citizens, one imagines instead that civic associations in Qatar will tend to bring together those whose goals and values already converge and, owing to their extreme demographic minority status, are—and seek to be—socially-insulated from outsiders. Paradoxically, therefore, it is Qataris who are least tolerant who will incline toward societal interaction with others, for this brings them together with *like-minded* others and reinforces

the more narrow social circle with which, more than more tolerant individuals, they are most comfortable.

Hence, associational life in Qatar is not what the civil society literature describes and what sometimes contributes to democratic transitions; it is simply an alternative route to the same goal, which is to secure a larger personal share of the benefits around which the entire state is structured, and to which each individual is equally entitled *qua* citizen (Beblawi 1978). And more than just an *alternative* route, civic involvement may also represent a more *cost-effective* route when compared to ordinary governmental institutions. As Beblawi notes of the *rentier* public sector, “Civil servant productivity is, understandably, not very high and they [civil servants] usually see their principal duty as being available in their offices during working hours” (91). By engaging with other well-connected individuals in private, then, Qataris may be able to circumvent a bureaucracy in the public sphere whose inefficiency inspires more frustration than confidence. If one can resolve a personal problem or avoid governmental red tape by exploiting influential societal contacts, why wait in line at a ministry behind dozens of foreigners or, say, petition one’s local representative?

As in Jamal’s Palestine, accordingly, one expects that associational life in Qatar rather than undermining traditional society and the prevailing regime is simply an extension of them, with those most involved being those who benefit from it the most—and who thus would stand to lose most from any revision of the political status quo. From here it is no great mystery why they should tend not to have a strong appreciation—in the sense of both normative support for and cognitive understanding of—democracy. Thinking poorly of official political institutions, as well as having no prior experience with democratic alternatives, these individuals are attracted to and involve themselves in associations that in fact are quite traditional and parochial. Or, to repeat what was summarized at the outset, civic participation cannot lead Qataris toward more democratic orientations, including political trust and social tolerance as well as support for a democratic political system, for it is precisely those who least value and least understand democracy that tend to be most actively engaged.

An important upshot of this line of reasoning, finally, is that the phenomenon to be explained is not then Qataris’ orientations toward democracy but rather their participation in societal organizations. That is, civic engagement does not alter individuals’ attitudes and

behaviors connected to democratic citizenship, as assumed in the standard literature on civil society; rather, those individuals who are already least tolerant of others, least oriented toward democracy, and least confident in formal governmental institutions tend to channel their social, economic, and political ambitions disproportionately through participation in civic associations. To begin to understand the way civic life interacts with democratic norms and behaviors in Qatar and elsewhere in the non-democratic Arab world, we must first invert our received dependent and independent variables.

These observations suggest several specific, testable hypotheses about the individual-level determinants of civic engagement in Qatar. More specifically, the argument above implies that in non-democratic societies characterized by strong horizontal and vertical ties—a tightly-connected citizenry combined with strong patron-client networks linking individuals to the state—

H1. Political interest is positively associated with civic engagement, ceteris paribus; whereas

H2. Social tolerance is negatively associated with civic engagement;

H3. Institutional confidence is negatively associated with civic engagement; and

H4. Democratic appreciation is negatively associated with civic engagement.

We investigate these four hypotheses we evaluate empirically using previously-unavailable data from the 2010 Qatar World Values Survey (WVS). This is the first comprehensive and nationally representative survey of political attitudes conducted in Qatar.

First, though, there remains one additional characteristic of Qatari society that bears on the explanatory model offered above and reflected in the four hypotheses: the issue of gender. In particular, is there reason to believe that the individual-level causal processes that tie civic engagement to democratic citizenship orientations may differ systematically for male and female Qataris? Since Qatar is a conservative society where women traditionally play a much more limited role than men in social and political life, it will be instructive to ask whether the drivers of civic engagement among women deviate qualitatively from those among men. Does the above description of societal organizations in Qatar and of the sort of individual that tends to be engaged in them apply in fact only to the experience of male Qataris?

One might argue, for example, that while civic participation serves for men above all as an entrée into clientelist networks useful for their own advancement, for Qatari women it may represent something fundamentally different, namely a welcome opportunity for wider

social interaction and a measure of personal independence. In this case, one would expect to observe among female Qatari respondents different empirical relationships than the four outlined above in *Hypotheses 1* through *4*. If associational life for women is chiefly a pathway to more social freedom, then perhaps it does take on a character more akin to that described in the civil society literature, insofar as civic engagement would then tend to attract women seeking to revise and expand upon their customary role in Qatari society. To investigate this possibility, we disaggregate our analysis into male and female sub-samples.

Data and Measures

The World Values Survey instrument was administered for the first time in Qatar between December 6 and December 28, 2010, by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University. Indeed, this was the first national survey of any kind to investigate attitudes toward governance and political life in Qatar. The survey was funded by a grant from the Qatar National Research Fund, a member of The Qatar Foundation. Its sample is based on a nationally-representative frame obtained from the Qatar General Electricity and Water Corp., the sole provider of these services to Qatari households. Two-stage stratified sampling was used for the random selection of respondents. With Qatar's administrative zones as strata, a household was first selected with proportionate stratification from the sampling frame. Next, an adult 18 years or older within each household was randomly selected for interview via predefined software randomization or (for households of five or more) a Kish table. A total of 1,455 households were sampled and 1,060 interviews completed, for an overall response rate of approximately 73%. TABLE 1 below presents the distribution of Qatari households by municipality in the frame and in the sample. TABLE 2 summarizes completed interviews by municipality.

With the exception of several items omitted for local sensitivities, the standard World Values Survey interview schedule (WVS 2010-2012 Wave) was administered by Arab, female field interviewers. The survey instrument contained items measuring, *inter alia*, each of the five concepts discussed above, namely civic engagement, political interest, institutional confidence, social tolerance, and democratic appreciation. Apart from political interest, which is measured by a respondent's answer to a single, direct question, each of these concepts is measured by an additive index constructed by combining multiple, highly inter-correlated items from the interview schedule, all of which can be found in the appendix.

TABLE I. *Sample Distribution, by Locality*

<i>Locality</i>	<i>Frame</i>	<i>Sample</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Doha	16,710	666	45.8
al-Rayyan	11,899	476	32.7
Wakra	1,919	78	5.3
Umm Salal	3,872	156	10.7
al-Khour	1,622	66	4.5
al-Shamal	428	18	1.2
<i>Total</i>	36,450	1,455	100

TABLE 2. *Final Interview Distribution*

<i>Locality</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Doha	463	43.7
al-Rayyan	357	33.7
Wakra	47	4.4
Umm Salal	124	11.7
al-Khour	47	4.4
al-Shamal	22	2.1
<i>Total</i>	1,060	100

The dependent variable *CIVIC ENGAGEMENT* is coded dichotomous, taking on a value of 1 for respondents who report being a member of at least one of several different categories of voluntary organizations, and 0 otherwise. By this measure, 384 or approximately 36% of all Qatari respondents—43% of men and 31% of women—are classified as civically-engaged. As noted already, *POLITICAL INTEREST* is measured by a respondent’s answer to a direct question: “What is the extent of your interest in politics?” *SOCIAL TOLERANCE* is a three-point measure based on respondent rejection of people of another race and/or religion as neighbors. It is coded 0 for respondents who reject both groups, 1 for those who reject one, and 2 for those who reject neither. The two remaining independent variables of interest, *INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE* and *DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION*, are measured by factor analysis, with generated factor scores based on several items that all load highly on a single factor and thus constitute a unidimensional measure. The items used to measure each variable are listed in the appendix. It is worth noting here, however, that, in line with our conceptual definition elaborated above, the measure of *DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION* combines normative support for democracy with knowledge of what democracy actually involves.

In addition to these four independent variables, we also include three controls. Two are dummies capturing older age (dichotomized at 29) and university-level education. A final measures a respondent’s total household income on a 10-point, subjective scale ranging from “the lowest” to “the highest” level. While one might expect any or all of these factors to be empirical determinants of civic engagement among Qatari men and women, the conceptual argument above implies no specific predictions about these relationships. We may speculate, for instance, that older individuals will tend to be more involved in civic life than younger as

their societal connections grow over time or as these become more useful for their personal advancement. Yet to the extent that none of this follows unambiguously from the foregoing theoretical framework, these controls serve principally to aid in interpretation of the results rather than as *a priori* explainers. Our resulting statistical model, to be estimated by probit regression, is therefore the following:

$$\Pr(\text{ENGAGED} = 1) = B_0 + \text{APPRECIATION} \cdot B_1 + \text{INTEREST} \cdot B_2 + \text{CONFIDENCE} \cdot B_3 + \text{TOLERANCE} \cdot B_4 + \text{COLLEGE} \cdot B_5 + \text{AGE} \cdot B_6 + \text{INCOME} \cdot B_7 + \varepsilon.$$

Findings and Interpretation

Before proceeding to the full model estimation results, we may consider as an introduction the bivariate relationships corresponding to each of our four hypotheses. These are shown in TABLE 3, which reports the average level of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among Qatari men and women classified, respectively, as “high” and “low” on each of the four democratic orientations. The table also shows for each orientation the relative difference in engagement among males and females in the two categories.

Turning first to DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION, the table shows that among men who are low in DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION, CIVIC ENGAGEMENT averages 51.8%, compared to only 35.0% among those who are high in DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION, a relative difference of –32.4%. Among women, the relative impact of DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION is weaker, although even here high appreciation corresponds to an aggregate reduction in engagement of more than 22%. The pattern is similar with SOCIAL TOLERANCE and INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE, each of which also

TABLE 3. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among Qataris of Low and High Democratic Orientations

Democratic Orientation	Males			Females		
	Low ^a	High	Diff.	Low	High	Diff.
DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION	51.8%	35.0	–32.4%	34.9%	27.2	–22.1%
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE	50.8	37.6	–26.0%	32.9	28.3	–14.0%
SOCIAL TOLERANCE	52.3	40.8	–22.0%	36.5	29.4	–19.5%
POLITICAL INTEREST	29.1	47.6	+63.6%	26.8	32.7	+22.0%

^a “Low” democratic orientations are defined as those falling below the variable mean, “high” above the variable mean.

TABLE 4. *The Determinants of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among Qataris, estimated by Probit Regression*

Variables	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Combined			Males Only			Females Only		
	B	s_b	$p > z $	B	s_b	$p > z $	B	s_b	$p > z $
APPRECIATION	-0.168	0.0431	0.000	-0.223	0.0602	0.000	-0.156	0.0637	0.014
INTEREST	-0.272	0.0526	0.000	-0.434	0.0780	0.000	-0.139	0.0718	0.052
CONFIDENCE	-0.149	0.0429	0.001	-0.204	0.0675	0.003	-0.108	0.0565	0.055
TOLERANCE	-0.204	0.0877	0.020	-0.273	0.132	0.038	-0.161	0.123	0.189
FEMALE	-0.302	0.0859	0.000	—	n/a	—	—	n/a	—
COLLEGE	0.193	0.0906	0.033	-0.0973	0.133	0.464	0.408	0.127	0.001
AGE	-0.182	0.0944	0.054	0.190	0.144	0.187	-0.484	0.126	0.000
INCOME	-0.00682	0.0231	0.768	0.0198	0.0331	0.550	-0.0275	0.0336	0.412
Constant	1.558	0.411	0.000	1.539	0.580	0.008	0.723	0.549	0.188
N	975			456			519		
Prob. > $F(\chi^2)$	0.0000			0.0000			0.0000		
Pseudo R^2	0.0640			0.0944			0.0577		

Note: Robust standard errors reported for all models; sampling weights utilized

evidences a strong, negative relationship with civic participation among Qatari men and women. Finally, most influential of all our democratic citizenship orientations is POLITICAL INTEREST: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT is nearly 64% higher among male Qataris of high political interest, and 22% higher among politically-interested females. Overall, then, the standard conception of associational life as an incubator of democrats would seem to diverge fundamentally from the picture that emerges from Qatar.

This imprint is etched only more deeply when we analyze our fully-specified model of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT. As per the probit estimates of TABLE 4, even after controlling relevant individual-level factors such as age, education level, and household income, there remain the same underlying relationships suggested above. Higher levels of DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION,

INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE, and SOCIAL TOLERANCE¹ lead to a lower predicted probability of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among males and females, whereas higher levels of POLITICAL INTEREST are associated with a greater likelihood of engagement. While these relationships operate more weakly among female Qataris, they do operate nonetheless, a finding that militates against our alternative proposition regarding the nature of societal participation among Qatari women. In Qatar, women as men seem to engage in association life primarily in order to seek their private advantage and interact with like-minded individuals, ends that serve exactly to reinforce rather than challenge the established social and political system. Yet at the same time, interestingly, female participation is also influenced decisively by age and education level, whereas neither factor affects the likelihood of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among males. College-educated women are much more likely to take part in societal life, as are women under the age of 30.

A clearer appreciation of these results may be gleaned from TABLE 5, which reports the predicted likelihood of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among Qataris given age, education, household income, and our four democratic orientations of interest. The absolute difference between the “low” and “high” columns can be interpreted as the substantive marginal effect of the corresponding independent variable. In the case of the two dichotomous controls, this between-column difference equals exactly that, while for the four democratic orientations it offers a more meaningful marginal effect than that of a one-unit increase. In order to put this estimate still further into context, finally, the remaining column reports the relative change in predicted probability of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT associated with each substantive marginal effect.

We see that, in general, these findings mirror those of TABLE 3 and indeed tend to be even more robust: of the eight relative percent changes in probability (excluding those of the control variables), five are larger in magnitude than their bivariate equivalents, while the remaining three are only marginally diminished. And since each of these percent changes in probability represents an independent effect, the combined impact of our several democratic orientations on the likelihood of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among Qataris is even more marked. Depicted in FIGURE 1, for example, is the predicted probability of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT for male and female Qataris whose levels of DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION *and* INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE are

¹ Strictly speaking, of course, the *Model 3* coefficient estimate on the variable SOCIAL TOLERANCE is not statistically-significant. Yet insofar as this variable is a significant predictor of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT in the pooled model and the estimate is of the expected sign and magnitude in *Model 3*, one may have some confidence in its explanatory power.

TABLE 5. *Predicted Probability of CIVIC ENGAGEMENT among Qataris, Probit Estimates*

Democratic Orientation	Males			Females		
	<i>Low</i> ^a	<i>High</i>	<i>Diff.</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Diff.</i>
DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION	50.3%	35.4	−29.6%	33.0%	24.6	−25.5%
INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE	50.3	33.5	−33.4%	33.2	25.8	−22.3%
SOCIAL TOLERANCE	46.7	36.7	−21.4%	32.5	27.1	−16.6%
POLITICAL INTEREST	27.1	56.2	+107.4%	25.7	33.8	+31.5%
Controls				<i>No</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>Diff.</i>
30 OR OLDER	—	n/a	—	42.0	24.6	−41.4%
COLLEGE EDUCATION	—	n/a	—	23.6	37.8	+60.2%

^a Here “low” democratic orientations are defined as −1 standard deviation from the mean, “high” +1 standard deviation. All predicted probabilities are calculated at the mean values of all other independent variables, using `mfx` in Stata.

both low (and, alternatively, both high). If one would include as well the impact of SOCIAL TOLERANCE, as in FIGURE 2, the dampening effect of high democratic political orientations on associational life in Qatar is still more pronounced, and this among both male and female respondents.

In the first case, the likelihood of civil society participation among men of high confidence and appreciation is but an estimated 26.6%, compared to 59.1% among those with low confidence and appreciation, a relative change in probability of −55.0%. Among females this relative decrease—from a 39.1% to a 21.0% likelihood—is −46.3%. In the second case, these effects are augmented even further: Qatari males with low DEMOCRATIC APPRECIATION, INSTITUTIONAL CONFIDENCE, and SOCIAL TOLERANCE are an estimated 64.7% less likely to be engaged than citizens with high democratic orientations, Qatari females 60.4% less likely. If one would go even further, finally, to include the effect of POLITICAL INTEREST in these indices, then the civic participation gap separating more and less democratically-oriented individuals would be greater yet.

Not to be lost among these sizable effects of democratic political culture orientations, however, are the influences on Qatari civic participation of education and age, which while not the main theoretical focus of the present study are valuable nonetheless in interpretation.

FIGURE 1. *Predicted Likelihood of Civic Engagement among Qataris of Low and High Democratic Appreciation and Institutional Confidence*





FIGURE 2. *Predicted Likelihood of Civic Engagement among Qataris, by Low and High Democratic Appreciation, Institutional Confidence, and Social Tolerance*



The most notable aspect of these effects is that each operates only among Qatari women, with younger and more educated females much more likely to be civically engaged. As indicated in Table 5, women older than 30 are more than 40% less likely to participate in civil society associations, while college educated women are about 60% more likely to be involved. The substantive effects of age and education among Qatari females are therefore an estimated two to three times greater than those of democratic political orientations themselves.

Beyond their intrinsic significance, moreover, these findings about the influence of the control variables age and education level also serve to illuminate other key results of the regression analysis. More particularly, the fact that these variables influence civic participation among women but not among men suggests a reason why the effects of democratic political culture orientations are stronger in magnitude and statistically more robust among the latter. It is not Qatari women in general but younger and college educated Qatari women that tend toward civic engagement, whereas participation among males is independent of any specific demographic characteristics. That the individual-level factors leading to engagement differ systematically, then, for Qatari males and females, accords with the notion that females, even as they generally are involved in civic associations for similar reasons as motivate men, are stirred as well by competing factors such as, perhaps, social independence and ambition.

Thus emerge two central conclusions: first, that the data generally lend compelling empirical evidence in favor of our four hypotheses about the relationship between civic life and democratic orientations in Qatar; and, second, that this relationship, even if it seems to operate relatively more weakly among women, is not limited to male Qataris only but obtains more widely. In Qatar, it indeed appears to be the case that those individuals who are least tolerant of others, least oriented toward democracy, and least confident in formal governmental institutions are disproportionately likely to be engaged in civil society organizations, and this among women as well as men. In Qatar, then—and one must suspect in institutionally-similar Arab Gulf regimes—civil society is no well-spring of democratic citizens but of citizens-*cum*-clients, and clients with understandably little appetite for altering the socio-political status quo. That this region of the Arab world has remained largely immune from the popular demands for reform voiced elsewhere in the Middle East, then, is perhaps more easily comprehended.

Appendix

Civic Participation

“Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations. For each organization, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?”

1. Sport or recreational organization
2. Art, music or educational organization
3. Environmental organization
4. Humanitarian or charitable organizations
5. Consumer organization
6. Self-help group, mutual aid group
7. Other organization

Democratic Appreciation

“How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is “not at all important” and 10 means “absolutely important” what position would you choose?”; and

“Many things are desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means “not at all an essential characteristic of democracy” and 10 means it definitely is “an essential characteristic of democracy.”

1. People choose their leaders in free elections.
2. Civil rights protect people from state oppression.

Institutional Confidence

“I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in it: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence, or none at all?”

1. Government institutions
2. The judicial system
3. The Shura Council

Social Tolerance

“On this list are various groups of people. Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”

1. People of a different race
2. People of a different religion

Political Interest

“What is the extent of your interest in politics? Are you:”

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested

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