

Geriatric Peace in Asia: Analyses Based on the AsiaBarometer Surveys 2003-2008

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Abstract: We test the hypothesis that the Asian people would prefer the government to spend more on social security and spend less on military as they become older. We found the estimation results which support the first half of the hypothesis, that is, there is a very strongly positive relationship between citizens' spending preferences on pension and their age. As to the second half of the hypothesis, we found that people in Asia tend to prefer less spending on military as their society itself becomes older. We also found that trust in government is a very strong determinant for the citizens' preferences on military spending.

Key words: aging society, pension, social security, military spending

1. Introduction

Haas (2007) extracts a positive and affirmative prediction from the fact of aging world populations, about which many scholars from many disciplines including Economics are worried about its negative impacts on economies. Doomsayers have argued that aging populations will threaten public financing and accumulate fiscal deficits because of the increased payments of social security programs for the elderly. Since the number of the young decreases relative to the number of the old, the current fiscal system will not be sustained unless future generations share larger fiscal burden or fiscal reform such as imposing new tax on current generation takes place. They also criticize economic growth is retarded. Haas (2007) points out, however, in his concept of geriatric peace, the possibility that aging populations bring about peace.

The fascinating reasoning made by Haas (2007) is as follows. Not only the US but also other great powers such as China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the UK are all growing older and already have or expected to have shrinking populations sooner or later. Aging population will cause the rise in social security benefits to the elderly and health-care expenditures as well as slowdowns in economic growth. Weapons purchases and military research and development will be crowded out due to tight budget. However, the US is growing

older to a lesser extent and less quickly than the other great powers. So, the magnitude of aging crisis in the US is lower than other great powers. It follows that the U.S. hegemony will continue. This is because the probability of international conflicts will rise if the dominant country anticipates a power transition in favor of a rising state or states or if such transition actually takes place. Since the previous argument add substantial support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging increases the likelihood of continued peaceful relations between the United States and the other great powers. Global aging is likely to result in a great power “geriatric peace.”

In addition, social aging may force states to increase military personnel costs. Firstly, increasing number of retirees in relation to new workers can lead to labor shortage. To employ the best employees in high-technology fields of militaries, they have to pay higher salaries to do so. Secondly, increasing pension expenditures for retired military personnel would crowd out weapons purchases and military research and development. Consequently, increasing military personnel costs increases the likelihood of the continuation of U.S. hegemony.

The continuation of U.S. hegemony or Pax Americana plays a key role in the above argument done by Haas (2007). Neglected are citizens’ mind and preferences about the choice between social insurance and military under budgetary constraint. We propose an empirical test of the concept of geriatric peace using the opinion survey data conducted in Asia recently. In addition, it is probably true but not absolutely sure whether people would prefer the government to spend more on social insurance or spend less on military as they become older.

We argue that citizens’ minds and preferences would also play an important role to achieve geriatric peace. As social aging progresses, the proportion of the elderly increases. The voter turnout of the elderly is higher than other age cohorts (Otake, 2010). So, in democratic states, the policy preferences of the elderly are decisive as suggested by the median voter theorem (Otake, 2010).

We test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis: People prefer more spending on social security and less spending on military as they become older in Asia.

By addressing this research question, we attempt to find the possibility of geriatric peace lying at the bottom or the necessary condition to achieve that goal. We aim at finding how ordinary citizens think about public spending. Needless to say, what we are going to find is about the minds and preferences of the ordinary citizens of Asian countries/societies. Even though the Asian people have particular minds and thoughts which may lead favorably to geriatric peace, whether the geriatric peace is actually achieved or not will depend on the type of

regime or the probability of the US hegemony. Otake (2010) states that, since the voter turnout of the elderly is higher than other age cohorts, the policy preferences of the elderly will be decisive as suggested by the median voter theorem. But this is true only in the democratic countries. Types of regime vary in Asia. We do not examine such political matters or international relations here but only citizens' minds seeing from the bottom, although Haas's article (2007) has many implications to international relations.

2. Estimation

To test the aforementioned hypothesis, we utilize the AsiaBarometer Survey data conducted in 32 countries/societies from 2003 to 2008. We analyze the following 29 Asian countries and societies plus the United States surveyed in 2008, namely, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, the United States, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. See Appendix 1 for which country/society and which year the survey was conducted in. The sample size of Asia is 49,158, and the grand total of the sample including Australia, Russia, and the United States is 52,215. The AsiaBarometer applies the nationwide and stratified random sampling methods in principal except some cases in which quota sampling methods are used when public security and costs mattered.

The AsiaBarometer asked the respondents whether they prefer more or less government spending in old-age pensions and the military and defense. These two questions serve as the dependent variables in the regression analyses. The exact wording is "Please indicate whether you would like to see more or less government spending in each area. Please bear in mind that more spending may require a tax increase." The choices include "Spend much more" "Spend more" "Spend the same as now" "Spend less" and "Spend much less" along with the "Don't know" responses. The AsiaBarometer asked these questions in all the countries and societies except Myanmar from 2003 to 2008.

Table 1 shows the distribution of survey responses for old-age pensions across the five categories ranging from "Spend much more" to "Spend much less" by country/society and of the entire Asian sample with the size of 44,591 excluding "Don't know" responses and missing values. Of the whole Asian sample, more than one-fourths (27%) of all the respondents preferred much more spending, two-fifths (41%) preferred more spending, about one-fourths (26%) preferred the same level of spending. Only a few preferred either less spending (5%) or much less spending (1%). Table 1 also shows the percentages vary across nations. For example, the percentage of those who prefer much more spending varies from a low of 12% in Japan to a

high of 59% in Tajikistan. The percentage of those who prefer the same level of spending varies from a low of 6% in Uzbekistan and Nepal to a high of 44% in Hong Kong.

The countries/societies are ranked based on the percentage difference index (PDI), constructed by subtracting the combined two positive ratings (“Spend much more” and “Spend more”) and the combined two negative ratings (“Spend less” and “Spend much less”). According to the PDI values reported in the second column from the right, Uzbekistan and Nepal are ranked 1st at 91, which are followed by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, while Pakistan is ranked the lowest at 38.

The last column of the table shows the proportion of those who are aged 65 and over. At the society level, the correlation coefficient between the PDI values and the proportions of 65 and over is -0.36, which is statistically insignificant.

We add the percentage of the US sample to compare the results of Asia and the US. The PDI value of the US is 51.

(Table 1 about here)

Table 2 shows the distribution of survey responses for the military and defense across the five categories ranging from “Spend much more” to “Spend much less” by country/society and of the entire Asian sample with the size of 44,256 excluding “Don’t know” responses and missing values. Of the whole Asian sample, one-fifth (20%) of all the respondents preferred much more spending, about one-third (32%) preferred more spending, more than one-third (36%) preferred the same level of spending. About one-tenth (9%) preferred less spending. Only a few (3%) preferred much less spending. Table 2 also shows the percentages vary considerably across nations. The percentage of those who prefer much more spending varies from a low of 1% in Taiwan to a high of 45% in India. The percentage of those who prefer more spending varies from a low of 9% in Japan to a high of 47% in Thailand.

The PDI takes on a negative value in Hong Kong and Japan in Asia and the United States. The PDI value is the highest in Laos at 82 points.

The last column of the table shows the proportion of those who are aged 65 and over. At the society level in Asia, the correlation coefficient between the PDI values and the proportions of 65 and over is -0.71, which is statistically significant. There is a negative relationship between the PDI and the proportion of 65 and over at the national level.

(Table 2 about here)

To test the aforementioned hypothesis, we fit multi-level ordered logit regressions. The

dependent variables are “Old-age pensions” and “The military and defense” respectively. We recoded the five categories into “Spend much more (5)” “Spend more (4)” “Spend the same as now (3)” “Spend less (2)” and “Spend much less (1)”. Our independent variables are divided into two levels, individual level and society level. The two dependent variables are individual level. The first set of the individual-level independent variables is worrying issues. The AsiaBarometer asked the question “Which, if any, of the following issues cause you great worry? Please choose all issues that cause you serious worry.” Among the 29 items we chose the following four items: “Terrorism,” “Wars and conflicts,” “The social-welfare system in your country,” and “Aging of societies.” The variable takes on the value of 1 if the answer is “Yes, I worry” and 0 if the answer is “No.” The second set of the individual-level independent variables is trust in institutions. The exact wording is “Please indicate to what extent you trust the following institutions to operate in the best interests of society. If you don’t know what to reply or have no particular opinion, please say so.” We recoded “Trust a lot (4)” “Trust to a degree (3)” “Don’t really trust (2)” and “Don’t trust at all (1)”. We didn’t use the “Haven’t thought about it” responses. We analyze trust in the central government and trust in army. The demographic profiles include gender, age, educational attainment, marital status, and household income. Gender is set as 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if male. Age is a raw variable. Educational attainment takes on the values of 1 (low), 2 (mid), and 3 (high). Marital status is set as 1 if the respondents are married and 0 otherwise. Household income takes on the value of 1 (low), 2 (mid), and 3 (high). Political ideology takes on the values from 1 (left) to 10 (right). The society-level independent variables include the proportion of those who are aged 65 and over in the nation and Political rights score of Freedom House. Political rights score takes on the values from 1 (not free) to 7 (free). GDP per capita is not included since it is highly correlated with the proportion of age 65 and over. The summary statistics are reported in Appendix 2.

3. Estimation results

Table 3 shows the results from fitting multi-level ordered logit regressions. The table reports the results of regressions of “Old-age pensions” and “The military and defense” on a set of independent variables mentioned above.

First, let’s look at the results of regression of old-age pensions on the set of independent variables. We are interested in the relationship between “Old-age pensions” and “Age” and we expect a positive relationship between them. The estimated coefficient on “Age” is positive and statistically significant. It would follow that people are more likely to prefer increasing spending on old-age pensions as they become older, holding the values of other variables constant. The z score of 9.71 which is quite high suggests that the result is very robust. Unexpected is the negatively estimated coefficient on proportion of those who aged 65 and over. As the percentage

of the elderly in the nation is larger, people tend to prefer less spending on the pensions. As to the variables to tap the extent to which the respondents worry about certain issues, those who worry about the aging of societies, the social welfare system of their countries, or health issues, people are more likely to prefer increasing spending on old-age pensions.

We are also interested in the relationship between “The military and defense” and “Age” and we expect a negative relationship between them. According to Table 3, the estimated coefficient on “Age” is not statistically significant. A possible explanation is that the military spending is affected by some compounding effects and as a result the coefficient is estimated as insignificant. For example, war was thought to bring about well-being of the young people (Obinger and Schmitt, 2011). This makes sense because once war began, many young healthy soldiers would be indispensable. Obinger and Schmitt (2011) argue that the welfare state is a by-product of the cold war. Turning to society-level variables, however, proportion of those who aged 65 and over is statistically significant and related negatively to the spending on the military and defense. Controlling for other variables, as the percentage of the elderly increases in the society, people are more likely to prefer less spending on the military and defense.

Noteworthy is the estimated coefficient on trust in army. Not only robust shown by quite high z score at 31.92, but also the estimated coefficient itself is very strong at 0.47 compared to other estimated coefficients, although we are interested in only the sign and statistical significance of the coefficients. The positive relationship implies that the more the general public trust in army, the more they prefer to spend on the military and defense, holding everything else constant. Why is “Trust in army” the most important determinant for “Spending on the military and defense”? We rely on the literature about trust (confidence) in government. According to the Institutional Performance Model, the extent to which people trust in government institutions depends on whether the institutions perform well (Newton and Norris, 2000). Since the general public trust in the government institutions and since they don’t think the government wastes the tax they pay, they prefer to spend more on the military and defense. Of course, the government activities may be complex and beyond popular understanding (Hardin, 2006), but the positively estimated relationship suggests that the general public at least judges the government performance regardless of whether the judges were done correctly or not, the topic of which is beyond of our analyses.

In the regression of old-age pensions, the dummies for 2004 and 2007 are significant and estimated as positive with the base of 2003. In the regression of the military and defense, all the dummies except 2006 are significant and estimated as negative.

(Table 3 about here)

We also fit ordered logit regressions to individual country sample. We used only survey results of the latest year. Table 4 and Table 5 show the results for the regressions of old-age pensions and the military and defense respectively. The plus (+) signs stand for statistically significant and positive relationship, while the negative (-) signs stand for statistically significant but negative relationship. We also report the results using the US sample for comparison.

We look at only the independent variable “Age” in the regressions of “Old-age pensions.” The estimated coefficient on “Age” is positive and statistically significant in 7 out of 27 countries/societies. Age is significantly positively related to old-age pensions in the United States also. Looking at “Age” in the regressions of the military and defense, the coefficient is estimated as positive and statistically significant in 15 out of 26 countries/societies. It is also positive in the United States. “Age” doesn’t matter except Mongolia and Pakistan.

(Table 4 about here)

(Table 5 about here)

4. Conclusions

We found a possibility that the concept of geriatric peace realizes in Asia. As long as the citizens’ preferences are appropriately reflected to the nation’s policy through the democratic process, aging populations do not always bring about harsh effects but do have at least one favorable result. It is called geriatric peace. This means that, literally, aging populations might bring about peace in the world. We found a necessary condition for the realization of geriatric peace in Asia. That is, the ordinary citizens in Asia tend to prefer increasing spending on old-age pensions, one of the welfare programs, as they become older. This is the evidence seen from the bottom or found in opinion surveys that examine the desires and preferences of the general public in Asia.

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Table 1 Government Spending - Old-age Pensions (2003-2008)

	Spend much more	Spend more	Spend the same as now	Spend less	Spend much less	PDI	% 65 and above
Uzbekistan	55	37	6	1	0	91	5
Nepal	48	44	6	1	1	91	4
Kyrgyzstan	55	34	10	1	0	88	5
Tajikistan	59	31	7	2	1	87	3
Bangladesh	55	31	12	1	0	85	5
Mongolia	36	47	17	0	0	83	4
Kazakhstan	33	50	14	2	1	81	7
Philippines	36	48	13	3	1	81	4
China	34	47	15	3	1	78	9
Laos	21	53	24	2	0	71	4
Singapore	33	40	24	2	1	70	9
Thailand	23	48	28	2	0	68	9
Brunei	33	33	33	1	0	65	4
Cambodia	30	45	13	9	3	63	4
Vietnam	14	51	32	2	1	62	6
Maldives	40	27	28	4	1	62	4
South Korea	19	48	28	4	1	61	11
Sri Lanka	16	41	37	5	1	52	8
United States	19	39	34	6	1	51	13
Malaysia	17	38	38	6	1	49	5
Afghanistan	27	37	18	10	8	47	2
Hong Kong	10	40	44	5	1	45	14
Indonesia	18	33	40	8	1	43	6
Taiwan	13	37	42	7	1	42	11
India	24	34	26	12	4	42	6
Bhutan	15	36	40	8	1	41	6
Japan	12	37	42	7	2	40	23
Pakistan	24	34	24	13	6	38	4
Total (Asia)	27	41	26	5	1	62	

Table 2 Government Spending - The Military and Defense (2003-2008)

	Spend much more	Spend more	Spend the same as now	Spend less	Spend much less	PDI	% 65 and above
Laos	42	41	17	1	0	82	4
Kyrgyzstan	32	43	21	4	1	70	5
India	45	31	18	5	1	70	6
Afghanistan	36	39	16	8	1	66	2
Bhutan	38	32	26	4	1	65	6
Brunei	25	40	34	1	0	64	4
Maldives	41	26	28	2	2	63	4
Thailand	19	47	31	3	0	62	9
China	25	40	29	4	1	60	9
Malaysia	21	40	32	7	1	53	5
Cambodia	29	36	24	9	2	53	4
Pakistan	30	34	23	9	4	51	4
Kazakhstan	13	39	42	6	1	45	7
Philippines	17	42	28	10	3	45	4
Sri Lanka	23	36	27	7	7	44	8
Vietnam	10	32	51	6	1	36	6
Uzbekistan	16	31	39	9	4	34	5
Mongolia	13	29	48	7	2	33	4
Bangladesh	16	28	41	13	3	28	5
Tajikistan	16	29	38	15	3	27	3
Singapore	8	26	56	8	1	25	9
Indonesia	9	30	47	12	2	24	6
South Korea	7	26	51	13	2	18	11
Nepal	7	31	38	20	3	15	4
Taiwan	6	20	50	19	5	2	11
United States	13	20	30	23	14	-4	13
Hong Kong	1	10	69	16	5	-9	14
Japan	3	9	47	29	12	-30	23
Total (Asia)	20	32	36	9	3	40	

Table 3 Multi-level Ordered Logit Regression

<i>Dependent Variables</i>	Spending on old-age pensions		Spending on the military and defense	
<i>Independent Variables</i>	Coefficient	Z-score	Coefficient	Z-score
<i>Individual Level</i>				
Worry about aging society	0.19	5.72**	0.005	0.15
Worry about social welfare system	0.17	5.96**	-0.09	(-3.06)**
Worry about wars and conflicts	-0.04	-1.59	0.06	2.40*
Worry about terrorism	-0.08	(-3.50)**	0.12	5.12**
Worry about health issues	0.13	6.18**	0.03	1.44
Trust in central government	-0.001	-0.06	0.03	1.76
Trust in army	0.07	4.95**	0.47	31.92**
Female	0.03	1.49	-0.06	(-2.76)**
Age	0.009	9.71**	-0.0005	-0.53
Educational attainment	-0.01	-0.66	-0.03	(-2.01)*
Married	-0.06	(-2.30)*	-0.03	-1.09
Household income	-0.0001	-0.01	0.01	0.82
<i>Society Level</i>				
% aged 65 and above	-0.07	(-3.79)**	-0.11	(-7.13)**
Political right (Freedom House)	0.15	4.98**	0.04	2.45*
Year-dummy 2004 (Base = 2003)	0.08	1.79	-0.19	(-4.53)**
Year-dummy 2005	-0.19	(-3.66)**	-0.44	(-8.61)**
Year-dummy 2006	-0.12	(-2.79)**	-0.19	(-4.34)**
Year-dummy 2007	0.11	2.20*	-0.17	(-3.48)**
Year-dummy 2008	-0.31	(-6.30)**	-0.51	(-10.37)**
cut1	-3.88	(-16.16)**	-3.49	(-23.65)**
cut2	-2.28	(-9.61)**	-1.75	(-12.06)**
cut3	-0.29	-1.24	0.45	3.11**
cut4	1.59	6.75**	2.15	14.83**
N	34481		34352	
Rho	0.100		0.096	

Notes: ** 1% significance level; * 5% significance level

Table 4 Ordered Logit Regression*Dependent Variables* Spending on old-age pensions

<i>Country/Society</i>	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	Brunei	Cambodia	China	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Japan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Laos	Malaysia
Worry about aging society		+			+									
Worry about social welfare system							+						+	
Worry about wars and conflicts	-		+	+							-			
Worry about terrorism		+												+
Worry about health issues				-						+				
Trust in central government			-	na			-		+		-	-	na	
Trust in army	-		+		+			+				-	na	
Political ideology	na	na	na	na	na		na		na	-	na	na	na	na
Female														
Age											+	+		
Educational attainment						+				-			+	+
Married											-			
Household income					-			-						
N	263	343	158	280	637	426	819	354	553	596	472	491	973	544
R squared	0.057	0.065	0.056	0.061	0.011	0.019	0.015	0.029	0.007	0.029	0.046	0.048	0.015	0.012

Table 4 (cont.) Ordered Logit Regression*Dependent Variables* Spending on old-age pensions

<i>Country/Society</i>	Mongolia	Nepal	Maldives	Pakistan	Phillipines	Singapore	South Korea	Sri Lanka	Taiwan	Tajikistan	Thailand	Uzbekistan	Vietnam	United States
Worry about aging society		+				+	+		+					+
Worry about social welfare system														
Worry about wars and conflicts				+										
Worry about terrorism			+		-	-		-						
Worry about health issues	-				+							+		+
Trust in central government	-	+	na									-	na	-
Trust in army	+		na					-					na	
Political ideology	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	-
Female				-				+						
Age	+				+					+	+	+		+
Educational attainment			+											
Married	-	-												-
Household income	-		+			-								
N	526	599	713	493	609	588	901	403	873	457	674	533	985	624
R squared	0.056	0.025	0.024	0.019	0.031	0.043	0.011	0.068	0.020	0.025	0.012	0.061	0.010	0.053

Table 5 Ordered Logit Regression*Dependent Variables* Spending on military and defense

<i>Country/Society</i>	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	Brunei	Cambodia	China	Hong Kong	India	Indonesia	Japan	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Laos	Malaysia
Worry about aging society						+								
Worry about social welfare system		—	—				—		—					
Worry about wars and conflicts	—						+							
Worry about terrorism														+
Worry about health issues								+						—

Trust in central government				na								—	na	+
Trust in army	+		+		+	+		+	+	+	+		na	+

Political ideology	na	na	na	na	na		na		na	+	na	na	na	na

Female	+	+												+

Age														
Educational attainment	+			+						—				
Married								+						
Household income				—								+		

N	264	345	165	278	760	427	840	303	569	591	461	487	989	542
R squared	0.084	0.024	0.059	0.034	0.009	0.031	0.019	0.062	0.020	0.048	0.014	0.016	0.007	0.055

Table 5 (cont.) Ordered Logit Regression

Dependent Variables Spending on military and defense

<i>Country/Society</i>	Mongolia	Nepal	Maldives	Pakistan	Phillipines	Singapore	South Korea	Sri Lanka	Taiwan	Tajikistan	Thailand	Uzbekistan	Vietnam	United States
Worry about aging society													+	
Worry about social welfare system													+	
Worry about wars and conflicts					+	-					-			
Worry about terrorism		-			-			+			+			+
Worry about health issues								+	+					

Trust in central government	+							-						
Trust in army		+		+			+	+		+	+			+

Political ideology	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	na	+

Female		+					-							
Age	-			+										
Educational attainment	-	+					-							
Married				-		-					+	-		
Household income											-			-
N	461	587	33	507	610	591	893	404	867	438	672	522	976	627
R squared	0.024	0.066	0.088	0.019	0.019	0.030	0.014	0.084	0.009	0.040	0.029	0.018	0.014	0.052

Appendix 1 Societies and Years the AsiaBarometer Survey was Conducted with Sample Size

	Society	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1	Afghanistan			874			
2	Australia						(1000)
3	Bangladesh			1008			
4	Bhutan			801			
5	Brunei		804				
6	Cambodia		812			1012	
7	China	800	1000		2000		1000
8	Hong Kong				1000		
9	India	822		1238			1052
10	Indonesia		825			1000	
11	Japan	857	825		1003		1012
12	Kazakhstan			800			
13	Kyrgyzstan			800			
14	Laos		800			1000	
15	Malaysia	800	800			1000	
16	Maldives			821			
17	Mongolia			800			
18	Myanmar	800	800			1000	
19	Nepal			800			
20	Pakistan			1086			
21	Philippines		800			1000	
22	Russia						(1055)
23	Singapore		800		1038		
24	South Korea	800	819		1023		
25	Sri Lanka	800		813			
26	Taiwan				1006		
27	Tajikistan			800			
28	Thailand	800	800			1000	
29	Turkmenistan			800			
30	United States						(1002)
31	Uzbekistan	800		800			
32	Vietnam	807	800		1000		
Total	52215 (49158)	8086	10685	12241	8070	7012	6121

Appendix 2 Summary Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Old-age pensions	44591	3.9	0.9	1	5
The military and defense	44256	3.6	1.0	1	5
Worry about aging society	48358	0.1	0.3	0	1
Worry about social welfare system	47358	0.2	0.4	0	1
Worry about wars and conflicts	48358	0.4	0.5	0	1
Worry about terrorism	48358	0.4	0.5	0	1
Worry about health issues	48358	0.4	0.5	0	1
Trust in central government	30155	3.5	0.7	1	4
Trust in army	26892	3.6	0.7	1	4
Political ideology	2725	4.2	2.3	1	10
Gender (Female)	48358	0.5	0.5	0	1
Age	48358	38.1	12.1	20	69
Educational attainment	48187	1.9	0.8	1	3
Marital status (Married)	48326	0.7	0.4	0	1
Household income	45833	2.0	0.8	1	3
Age 65 and over	48358	7.7	5.0	2.4	22.9
Political rights	48358	3.6	2.2	1	7