

Soft news and political cynicism:

How exposure to political information genres relates to public cynicism about politics

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Abstract

The media are often blamed for electorates' low levels of political knowledge and involvement, due to the tendency to cover political news in an increasingly entertaining manner. This study investigated whether and how watching particular news genres (soft or hard) relate to political cynicism. Using a novel and sophisticated measure for media exposure, analyses of three recent surveys found a strong relationship between watching certain news programs and political cynicism. The people who watched serious news more often were less cynical about politics than people who watched popular kinds of news more often. This relation seems not to be conditional on differences of education levels, political awareness or newspaper readership. Except for one interaction between exposure to hard versus soft news and political awareness in the most recent survey, no other interaction effects were found. In short, this paper confirms what was already expected by many. Controlling for many potential confounding variables, there still exists a strong relation between the television programs people watch and their level of political cynicism.

Keywords: soft news, political cynicism, infotainment, news genres, entertainisation, political attitudes, political communication

Soft news and political cynicism: How exposure to political information genres relates to public cynicism about politics

The entertainization of political information is ongoing, with more and more programs falling into the category of so-called *soft* news (Holbert, 2005). Increasingly news coverage is not directly related to politics or policy issues, with now higher proportions of news stories that feature human-interest elements, deal with dramatic incidents or crime, are sensational or about personal affairs (Patterson, 2000). Also within political news, dramatic elements are increasingly used to make the news more attractive for non-traditional news audiences. Such entertainization of political information is also characterized by news focusing on human-interest issues. Proponents of such developments claim that thereby segments of society receive political information that otherwise would avoid such information altogether (Baum, 2003a; Baum, 2003b). By contrast, as the number of soft news programs increases, criticism follows. Scholars argue that seeing more soft news, at the expense of watching serious news, might lead to lower levels knowledge of public issues or negative attitudes towards politics (Postman, 1986; Putnam, 2000; Robinson, 1976). This study concentrates on the consequences of soft news for political cynicism.

If indeed the pessimistic camp is right, the relationship between soft news and negative attitudes towards politics can be relevant for the functioning of political systems. Negative perceptions of politics are negatively related to turning out to vote and the willingness to learn about and discuss politics (e.g., Schyns and Nuus, 2007). Thus, a large share of politically cynical people would lead to an undermined legitimacy of governments, as popular discussion, interest and involvement in politics are needed to define societal goals and to democratically choose executives (Dalton, 2000). Declining public support in turn corresponds to a diminished ability of politicians to solve societal problems (Hetherington, 1998).

The media have been identified as one important factor explaining political cynicism (Adriaansen *et al*, 2010). Mass media were and are the main source of political information for about two-thirds of the people in various western countries (Aalberg and Jensen, 2007; Newton, 1999; Robinson, 1976; Van der Eijk, 2000). If political news coverage increasingly is portrayed in terms of personal matters and dramatic events, then it can be assumed that changes in citizens' political understanding and attitudes might be related to such developments. Thus, the way media deal with politics can be assumed to matter for levels of political cynicism.

This study analyses if and how political cynicism is related to media exposure, in particular exposure to different types of political news programs. So far, only a few studies investigated the influence of different news genres on political attitudes; however, most of them confined to a United States context with a very different media system from the European one (e.g., Baum, 2003b; Moy *et al*, 2005). The current study will contribute to further understanding of the effects of soft news genres in a European context, using a novel measure for news genre exposure.

Developments in political news coverage

The increased competition between television channels for audience shares, due to the introduction of the first commercial broadcasters in Europe from the middle of the 1980's, led to a new age of political communication (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999). Audiences became more fragmented, numbers of viewers for serious news declined and a blurring of genres led to *infotainment*, making informative programs more attractive by mixing them with entertainment (Patterson, 2000) - "a shift from programs in the public interest to programs the public is interested in" (Brants and Neijens, 1998, p. 150).

Scholars distinguish various democratic functions of the media: informing about issues of public interest, being a platform for dialogue between societal representatives and controlling the governments' use of power (Brants, 2000; Delli Carpini, 2004). Nisbet (2008) described the democratic media functions more specifically; namely, educating and socialising people about politics, and persuading citizens to conform to democratic norms. Despite these clear descriptions of media functions, it is hard to make a distinction between the media that conform to these functions and those that do not. This makes defining and delineating politically relevant media difficult (Baym, 2005; Delli Carpini, 2004; Van Praag and Brants, 2000). The impact of many popular news programs would be neglected by defining too narrowly which programs are politically relevant (Baum, 2005). Most studies on political cognition, attitudes or behaviour only deal with newspapers and serious news programs, but did not investigate effects of soft news formats (see Baum, 2005; Holbert, 2005). However, soft news programs also deal with issues of public interest, including politics, and serious news editors often find it necessary to provide excitement to keep viewers interested (Graber, 1994). Even more important, focusing only on serious news media fails to study the effects of programs that are the only source of political information for a large share of citizens (Baum, 2003a); lower educated groups prefer entertaining news programs on average more than higher educated people. Therefore, it is important to assess the influence of other than traditional political information formats.

Political news and political cynicism

After the introduction of television one camp of scholars expected, or at least hoped, that television would improve society's democratic quality by raising the level of political interest and bringing politicians and voters closer to each other (Glaser, 1965). Television is a medium that enables people to learn just by passively watching (Gerbner *et al*, 1984; Graber,

1990). Nevertheless, there was also a more critical camp (Manheim, 1976). The assumption here is that the audience gets less involved, because of the way information is presented, and a loss of intellectual ability to understand politics among citizens, due to their reliance on television. The effect of television on democratic quality thus seems to be twofold and scholars can roughly be divided in those emphasising undesired consequences and those emphasising desired consequences of media exposure (Newton, 1999). The critics believe that exposure to television, due to negative bias in the news coverage, increases political cynicism and alienation from politics (Delli Carpini, 2004; Newton, 2006) or gives people the impression that understanding and participating in politics is difficult (Robinson, 1976). Also Putnam (2000) argued that the time spent on television restrains people from civic-oriented activities and social participation. Ultimately, Robinson (1976) predicted three outcomes of this so-called video malaise: political volatility among voters, withering of the political parties and the rise of an anti-democratic party.

The other camp of scholars expects positive outcomes of media exposure, collectively referred to as mobilisation (Newton, 1999). They believe there are no general effects of watching television, but stress the importance of content instead of format. The impact of specific television genres and programs is what matters; therefore, they believe that television can be an instrument of political education. Watching television news has been shown to increase political knowledge and participation (Norris, 1996); however, knowledge gains pertained more to politicians than to issues or parties (Chaffee and Kanihan, 1997). Furthermore, television seems to function as a *bridging medium*; enlightening and involving people who know less than average about politics and thus decreasing knowledge and participation gaps (Chaffee and Kanihan, 1997; Eveland and Scheufele, 2000). Prior (2007) argued that this will only happen in media environments without much choice, because in large media markets, people less interested in public affairs probably choose to watch

programs other than serious news. Newton (1999) investigated both expectations and concluded that the effect of television depends on specific programs; watching news increased knowledge and understanding, whereas watching television in general did not have a clear influence. However, this study was conducted in the United Kingdom, whereas most other research was performed in the United States with a different media and political system. The explanation for the importance of television genres might be that American television was and is highly entertainment oriented, whereas, due to its public broadcasting services, European television always focused more on information dissemination (Brants and Van Praag, 2006; Curran *et al*, 2009). However, the introduction of commercial television in Europe, led to the adoption of more entertaining formats in Europe as well (Schulz, 1997).

Contrary to the studies on effects of exposure to television in general or to particular television programs, other research focused on effects of specific content. Various experimental studies (Cappella and Jamieson, 1996; De Vreese, 2004; Jackson, 2011) found that exposure to news framed in a strategic way increased cynicism about politicians, whereas news pertaining to political positions (substantive coverage) did not change the level of cynicism. Exposure to strategy frames, however, appears to particularly affect lower educated people (Valentino *et al*, 2001). Contrary to these experimental studies, an effect of strategically framed news on cynicism was neither found by a cross-sectional study nor by a panel-survey study (Adriaansen *et al.*, 2010); however, substantively framed news seemed to decrease political cynicism for young people.

A study combining content analysis and a two-wave panel study showed that another frame, namely personalised news (human interest frames and emotional content), lowered political cynicism; though only for citizens less interested in politics (Jebril and Erik, 2011). On the other hand, cynicism showed to be stimulated by news about private lives of politicians or personal conflicts. In line with that, exposure to rough political debates with

raised voices, rude interruptions, or attacking statements, seemed to decrease trust in politicians, compared to situations in which politicians debated friendly (Mutz and Reeves, 2005). However, people enjoyed the uncivil tone more than the civil tone. Following the public demand would thus lead to the supply of more aggressive political coverage and subsequently to decreased trust in politicians.

Therefore, some argue that soft, popular news programs threaten democracy, because they often do not pay attention to issues of public importance. Others challenge this vision and state that such programs can educate people about public issues, which they would otherwise not know about, because they often do not watch serious news (Baum, 2003a; Baum, 2005). For example, it was found that certain people learned relatively a lot about politics, especially about candidates, from talk shows (Weaver, 1996). In addition, watching soft news increased the likelihood to know about certain appealing topics (e.g., name of the military dictator of Panama) (Baum, 2003a). However, this knowledge increase was only found for lower educated people. This study will not focus on effects of soft news on knowledge, but on the relationship of watching such programs with attitudes towards politics. One of the often feared consequences of the increase of soft news coverage, is that it might make the public more cynical about politics.

A critical attitude towards politics is not in itself problematic. According to Berelson, “a healthy and critical attitude toward authority” (1952, p. 315) is part of an appropriate character trait attributable to an individual in a democracy. However, 60 years later, scholars are more worried about citizens becoming too critical, or even cynical about politics. Although distrust may be perceived positively for democracy, as a naïve and passive electorate is not conducive with democracy. Cynicism could never benefit democratic quality. Cynical citizens expect to be disappointed by their representatives and are pessimistic about rewards of political engagement (Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). Hence, cynicism, in Schyns

and Nuus' (2007) view, includes anger and hostility towards, antagonistic distrust and contempt for politicians. Based on their literature review, they came to the following definition of political cynicism; "an individual's attitude, consisting of a conviction of the incompetence and immorality of politicians, political institutions and / or the political system as a whole" (p. 97). A distinction in the beliefs about integrity and competence of politicians was also found in a study that investigated the dimensions of political cynicism (Adriaansen, 2011). The study presented in this paper used the definition of Schyns and Nuus, but only focused on cynicism about politicians, as Adriaansen (2011) also did, because cynicism about the political system or institutions did not structurally increase in the Netherlands in the last decades (Bovens and Wille, 2008; Van der Brug and Van Praag, 2007).

Research question and hypotheses

This study investigates how watching television news programs is related to cynicism about politicians. Following prior investigations, a distinction is made between hard and soft news. According to Patterson (2000), hard news is the "coverage of breaking events involving top leaders, major issues, or significant disruptions in the routines of daily life, such as an earthquake or airline disaster" (p. 3); Lehman-Wilzig and Seletzky (2010) defined hard news topics as issues in the fields of politics, economics or society. Baum (2003b) describes it as in-depth coverage of politics with thematic frames and attention for experts and politicians. Consequently, it can be expected that the people watching such news understand politics better, see the actions politicians take and therefore become less cynical. Logically, soft news is the opposite, "more sensational, more personality-centered, less timebound, more practical, and more incident-based" (p. 4). Popular, soft news formats often have more entertaining elements and focus especially on sensational events (Grabe *et al*, 2001) without providing context to stories or paying attention to experts (Baum, 2004), but for example, giving *the*

man in the street the chance to express his opinions (Baum, 2003b; Baum, 2004). Therefore, an increased knowledge of negative aspects of society could logically be expected, as the daily events in such news are often acts of crime or other negative events and *the man in the street* reacts, reasonably, not optimistic to such events. However, almost all news programs have characteristics of hard as well as soft news (Baum, 2003b) and classifications into one or the other group can be problematic; most programs seem to belong to an intermediate category (Lehman-Wilzig and Seletzky, 2010). Accordingly, it is more appropriate to use a scale and position different programs on this scale, as proposed by Brants and Neijens (1998). Such an infotainment scale, ranging from news programs with strong entertaining elements to purely informative news programs allows locating people according to their viewing habits. In line with the above we expect:

H₁: People who watch more serious, hard news programs are less cynical about politics than people who watch more popular, soft news programs.

Effects of mass mediated political information are increasingly recognised as being conditional (McLeod *et al*, 2009); this also seems reasonable for effects of exposure to different kinds of news genres on political cynicism (Prior, 2007). Previous studies found that effects of watching news programs were conditional on viewers' level of education or political awareness (Baum, 2003a; Baum, 2005; Zaller, 1992). It is that expected that more politically aware and higher educated people are less affected by the news programs they see, as they can fall back on the knowledge they already have. It was also found that people who are not frequent readers of newspapers learn much more from soft news, than the people who already obtain this information in the written media (Prior, 2007). In line with this, it is expected that the groups with a higher level of political awareness have more consistent political attitudes; whereas less

aware people are probably more affected by exposure, due to their inability to draw upon previous knowledge and to put news into perspective (Zaller, 1992).

H₂: People who are higher educated, more politically aware and read newspapers frequently are less affected by watching particular news programs compared to people who are lower educated, less politically aware and do not read newspapers frequently.

Method

This study employs public opinion survey data originating from three recent surveys with samples representative for the Dutch population. Every survey contains questions about television viewing habits and various items to determine respondents' level of political cynicism. The secondary analysis of these data sources helped to verify the robustness of relationships across time and data collections.

Data

Data from Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES) of 2006 and 2010 were utilized.¹ Fieldwork for these surveys was carried out in cooperation with Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Interviews were conducted face-to-face and by telephone; the second part of the surveys was done via self-completion questionnaires. The total non-response rate of the survey was 48.3% in 2006 and 41.7% in 2010. The datasets contain the answers of more than 1,500 respondents who completed the survey in each year (2006: $n = 1,895$; 2010: $n = 1,633$). The third dataset was the Citizens' Outlooks Barometer (COB) from the third quarter of 2009.² Respondents for this survey were selected by phone, out a panel of MarketResponse Netherlands that is based on random selection. From this panel 1595 respondents were selected, of which 1095 completed the questionnaire (832 by Internet; 263 on paper); a non-response rate of 31.3%.

Measures

Political cynicism: The key dependent variable ‘political cynicism’ was represented by indices of several items. Mokken scale analysis, a probabilistic version of the Guttman scale analysis, confirmed their unidimensional structures.³ A scale was found that satisfied the criteria for a good scale (Mokken, 1971) by performing Mokken scale analysis in an exploratory way on the data of 2009.⁴ Five items asking about politicians’ competency, commitment, self-interestedness, efficiency and behaviour formed a theoretically fitting and rather strong Mokken scale ($H = .48$; $\rho = .79$; $M = 12.08$, $SD = 3.31$) (the full list of survey statements of the three years is provided in Appendix A).⁵ Higher scores indicated a more cynical attitude about politics. The data of 2006 survey contained more items measuring political cynicism and with these it was also possible to create an almost equally well-fitting and strong Mokken scale ($H = .42$; $\rho = .80$; $M = 18.16$, $SD = 6.69$). Political cynicism was measured with ten items, of which some were very similar to statements in the 2009 dataset. The scale measuring political cynicism for the DPES 2010 data was somewhat stronger and also fitted well ($H = .44$, $\rho = .89$; $M = 28.14$, $SD = 9.47$); fifteen items were used for this scale. The latent variables representing political cynicism were transformed in such a way that the lowest score was 0 and the highest score was 100; so effects were comparable across models.

Extent of exposure to hard versus soft news programs: To create an infotainment scale as proposed by Brants and Neijens (1998), items measuring which news programs respondents regularly watched were treated as preferential choice data (Coombs, 1964). Using the unfolding technique (Van Schuur, 1992), it was possible to place news programs (and thus also respondents’ viewing behaviour) on one unidimensional joint scale, ranging from entertaining (soft) to informational (hard) news. This allowed for the use of one variable for viewing behaviour in the analyses and is a novel and more sophisticated way to operationalise media exposure to particular news genres than found in previous studies.

The studies conducted before simply asked how often respondents watched news (Taniguchi, 2011), counted how often respondents watched a few programs that were classified as either soft or hard news (Baum, 2003a), or asked people to rank preferences for television genres, including news (Prior, 2003). These measures have the disadvantage that they are less precise, because they only ask about a few programs, and do not take into account that the difference between soft and hard news is not one of two absolute points, but a scale with many intermediate classifications (Lehman-Wilzig and Seletzky, 2010). Unfolding procedures order items (programmes) by the degree to which respondents' (citizens) preferences (watching behaviour) overlap. The more there is an overlap in respondents' preferences for two programmes, the more closely they are positioned together. Unfolding analysis allows for an ordering of items (programmes), so that if there is an ordering of three items in the final scale 'ABC', that there will be a minimal number of respondents who prefer program A and C but not B.

First, an unfolding scale was created for the COB survey, using dummy variables which indicated whether respondents watched certain television programs. The theoretically based start set was largely similar to the order of programs found by Brants, Cabri and Neijens (2000) for how informative various television programs were in the period surrounding the 1998 Dutch elections. Therefore, the start set ranged from the nationally oriented and popular news programs, because those obviously contain the most soft news elements, followed by the news broadcast of the commercial broadcaster, a serious news talk show, current affairs programs, and ending at a serious discussion program purely about politics.⁶ The remaining items, indicating if participants watched the news program of the public broadcaster and another current affairs program, were placed by the software on the correct location.

The homogeneity coefficient ($H = .43$) revealed that the final scale fit well substantively (Van Schuur, 1992); Van Schuur (1992) specified values of $H = .30$ and higher as indicating significant and substantively relevant fit.⁷ Moreover, the scale made sense theoretically, ranging from hard to soft news programs (see Table 1). Hence, we will use this scale in the subsequent analyses. The scale values representing respondents' exposure to particular television news programs ($M = 9.31$, $SD = 2.68$) were calculated using Van der Brug's (1993) procedure.⁸ Higher scores on this scale indicated that respondents watched more serious (hard) and less popular (soft) news.

The DPES surveys also asked which news programs respondents watched, but more precisely (four-point scale; from never to almost daily) and for less programs. Using the same order as in the previous unfolding analysis, scales were found that fitted the data well (2006: $H = .46$; 2010: $H = .42$). The identical program order, high H -values and especially the similar automatic placement of the news programs proved the robustness of the scale used in this study. Furthermore, other diagnostics, among the individual item H -values (see Table 1), implied that the scale represented the underlying infotainment dimension properly. Every respondent indicated to watch at least once in a while one of these programs, so scale values could be calculated for all respondents (2006: $M = 7.60$, $SD = 1.90$; 2010: $M = 7.62$, $SD = 2.09$).

<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>

Interaction terms: Variables representing interactions with exposure to hard versus soft news were used in the analyses. To avoid multicollinearity problems in the analyses, z-standardisation was applied to the scale values of watching the particular news programs. Educational levels were multiplied by this variable. An interaction was also formed by

multiplying with respondents' level of political awareness and by multiplying with the dummy variable representing whether respondents are frequent newspaper readers.

Control variables: Age and dummy variables for gender, educational levels, income, newspaper reading and Internet use were used to control for potentially confounding effects. Dummy variables were used because of the small number of answer options for the survey questions measuring these variables.⁹ Furthermore, in the COB survey, the question was asked with a five-point answer scale how difficult respondents find it to understand what happens in national politics, whereas the DPES survey asked how interested respondents were in politics, also with a five-point answer scale. The answers of both questions were recoded into three dummy variables to use it as control variables in the analyses. These variables were given the same name in the results section, *political awareness*, as it can be assumed that being more politically interested leads to a better understanding of politics. For example, relationships between political knowledge and political interest (Prior, 2003) or between political interest and political engagement (Sunshine Hillygus, 2005) were demonstrated earlier. Furthermore, the DPES survey asked questions about how respondents coped with politics.¹⁰ Therefore, it was possible to create the latent variable *internal political efficacy* (2006: $\alpha = .60$; 2010: $\alpha = .60$). The characteristics of the samples in the three surveys are presented in Appendix B.

Results

Regression analyses were used to investigate the relationship between political cynicism and the extent of exposure to hard or soft news, controlling for possible confounding variables. Robust standard errors were used for estimation of the models, because of heteroscedasticity issues in analysing the DPES data.¹¹ Parameter estimates of the three years can be found in Table 2. These results are discussed simultaneously as they are largely consistent across years.

<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>

The results indicate that there was a strong relationship between exposure to certain news programs and political cynicism. Respondents' values on the exposure to hard versus soft news scale had a significant negative effect on political cynicism. This means, that as respondents watched more often serious and informative (hard) television news, they had on average a lower level of political cynicism compared to when they watched popular (soft) news programs more often, and *vice versa*. This confirms the first hypothesis. Furthermore, higher levels of political cynicism were found for older people, men, people with a low level of education, less politically aware people and people with a low internal efficacy.

The standardised regression coefficients indicated that the influence of exposure to the different news programs was stronger than the effects of almost all other variables in the models. It was the strongest predictor of political cynicism in 2006; only age had a stronger influence in the data of 2009; and just age and internal efficacy were stronger in the 2010 data, whereas education had an equally strong influence.

The findings also showed that all of the interactions with television viewing behaviour did not turn out as significant; political cynicism was not affected differently by viewing habits for different groups in the two least recent surveys. Thus, the second hypothesis needs to be rejected; all tested interaction effects showed that newspaper readers, higher educated and more politically aware people were not significantly less affected by watching particular news programs.

In addition, one remarkable difference between the results from the three years is that the effect of reading newspapers was significantly negative in 2006, but insignificant in the later years 2009 and 2010. One explanation could be a decreased importance of reading newspapers, the increased importance of the Internet, a decreased amount of time spent on reading

newspapers or the increased popularity of free newspapers. Overall these findings establish a strong relationship between the extent of exposure to hard versus soft news programs and political cynicism.

Discussion

Baum (2003a) shows positive consequences of watching soft news for the democratic quality of society; it increased knowledge among the politically unaware people. However, this study found that the people, who watched more soft news programs had higher levels of political cynicism than those who watched hard news more often. The positive effect on political cynicism of exposure to relatively entertaining news might be explained by the tendency of these programs to focus on negative news and to show ordinary people expressing their thoughts and emotions (Baum, 2004; Grabe *et al*, 2001). This possibly negatively impacts people's impression about the work politicians do for the country. Moreover, these popular news programs often seem not to give politicians or experts the opportunity to explain the situation or to defend themselves against allegations. An increase in knowledge and an increase in cynicism thus seem to go hand-in-hand, as an increased knowledge of political events might lead to disappointment in the work of politicians. Furthermore, this study seems to reject the idea that effects of exposure to hard or soft news are conditional on levels of education, political awareness or newspaper reading.

Though a few studies before studied effects of soft news (in terms of popular news; not talk shows or late night comedy shows), this is the first to focus on the consequences for the levels of political cynicism in society. Before it was found that soft television news makes it possible for the people not very interested in politics to learn about important public issues (Baum, 2003a). Another study found that personalised news lowers political cynicism, whereas exposure to news about private lives of politicians or their personal conflicts were related to

higher levels of political cynicism (Jebril and Erik, 2011). This study also found a negative side-effect of watching soft news. People watching more news with entertaining elements, often have higher levels of political cynicism. Though the novel scale that was used in this study to measure the extent of exposure to soft or hard news in this study is sophisticated, the use of secondary data had some limitations. First, respondents were asked if they saw a number of news programs in the surveys; however these were not all the possible news programs on television that can be classified as either hard or soft news. A more extensive list of programs in the surveys could perhaps have made the infotainment-scale somewhat stronger. Second, though using a survey method makes it possible to generalise the findings to a larger population and controlling for important factors that relate to selection bias, such as age, gender, education and income (Smith *et al*, 2008), the study also has the typical limitation that is always associated with cross-sectional studies: the difficulty to prove causality relationships, because there is no clear time-order of cause and effect (Cappella, 2002; Schulz, 1997). That is why future research should further explore the relationship between watching soft news and political cynicism by means of an experiment, to study the causality relationship more convincingly.

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Notes

¹Nationaal kiezersonderzoek. The DPES 2010 dataset is not definitive yet as some small things might still be changed in the near future. More information can be found on <http://www.dpes.nl/>

²Continu Onderzoek Burgerperspectieven. More information can be found on http://www.scp.nl/Publicaties/Alle_publicaties/Publicaties_2009/COB_Kwartaalbericht_2009_3 (Dutch)

³A latent variable, measuring political cynicism, was created with a Mokken scale and not with factor analysis, because assumptions of principal component analysis and reliability analysis are often too strong to be satisfied by variables (Van Schuur, 2003). The choice was made for Mokken scaling and not Rasch scaling, because this procedure tests all necessary assumptions for a hierarchical structure.

⁴The statistical program MSPWIN 5.0 was used for Mokken scale analyses.

⁵Next to the *H*-value, Mokken scaling has more diagnostic information to assess model fit. These can be found in Appendix C for all three the years. The reliability coefficient ρ was used, which in some cases is less biased than Cronbach's α (Sijtsma and Molenaar, 1987).

⁶Unfolding analyses were conducted using the statistical program MUDFOLD 4.0. The theoretically based start set ranged from *EditieNL*, *4 in het Land* and *Hart van Nederland* (nationally oriented and popular news programs) followed by *RTL4 Nieuws*, *Pauw & Witteman* (news talk show), *EenVandaag* and *Nova* (current affairs programs), and ending at *Buitenhof*. *NOS Journaal* and *Netwerk* were placed automatically in the scale. Two news programs did not fit in the scale, namely *RTL-Z Nieuws* and *BusinessClass*. The first, probably because it was broadcasted during weekdays in mornings and afternoons, which makes it hard for working people to watch. *BusinessClass* does not fit in this scale, probably because very few people watch this program.

⁷Additional checks confirmed the stability of the scale. *H*-values for the individual items were sufficiently high (see Table 1). Most deviations from a perfect unfolding scale were small and seemed to be caused by the time on which programs were broadcasted; time might be a disturbing underlying dimension. The other diagnostic information that gives insight into the goodness-of-fit of unfolding scales are described in Appendix D for all three the years.

⁸The scores of respondents to programs were multiplied by the odd number related to the place of a program on the scale and thereafter divided by the total of the response values. In this case, Scale value =

$$(\textit{EditieNL} \times 1 + 4 \textit{ In Het Land} \times 3 + \dots + \textit{Buitenhof} \times 19) / (\textit{EditieNL} + 4 \textit{ In Het Land} + \dots + \textit{Buitenhof}).$$

Consequently, the minimum scale value is 0 and the maximum scale value is equal to the number of items in the scale multiplied by the highest assessment possible for these items, multiplied by 2 and minus 1 (here: $10 * 1 * 2 - 1 = 19$). When respondents indicated that they did not watch any of these programs regularly, a response pattern with only zeros was the result. Consequently, it is not possible to know whether respondents' preference is located at the left or right side of the scale or if they did not watch television at all, so no scale values are assigned to them. This occurred for 48 respondents in the COB 2009 data, but not for any respondent in the DPES 2006 and 2010 data, probably because of the more precise measurement in the DPES surveys. Van der Brug's (1993) averaging method has the advantage compared to the normal unfolding procedure of calculating scale values, that it can calculate values for almost all combinations, whereas the latter method requires that respondents give at least the highest score possible to one item. Hence, Van der Brug's approach leads to less missing information and is less sensitive to small variations in response patterns.

⁹ Whether respondents read a newspaper almost every day was asked in the DPES surveys, allowing to create a dummy variable. The COB questionnaire asked this somewhat differently, that is how often respondents used newspapers to keep track of national politics. A dummy variable was created, which indicates whether this was done very often. Similar dummy variables were used indicating whether respondents visited websites with political or social news more than three times a week (DPES 2006 and 2010) or regularly to often (COB 2009).

¹⁰ The latent variables measuring internal political efficacy was formed by the cumulative score of responses on the following statements; did people considered themselves qualified for politics, did they believe to have a good understanding of political problems and did they think that politics is too complicated for people like them (all answered on a 4-point scale ranging from agree to disagree; first two statements were recoded).

¹¹ Stata 10.1 was used to conduct the regression analyses. Diagnostical information of the models was studied before results were interpreted. Various outliers were found in the three years; however, these seemed not to be caused by mistakes or misunderstandings. Therefore, these observations were kept in the analyses; however, removing them did not significantly change outcomes. The residuals of the COB 2009 data were homogenous (White's test: $\chi^2(65) = 73.79, p = 0.21$; Breusch-Pagan test: $\chi^2(1) = 1.19, p = 0.28$). However, tests for homoscedasticity in the regression models of the DPES 2006 and 2010 data indicated that the variance of the residuals was not homogenous; the null hypotheses of the White-test (2006: $\chi^2(78) = 114.80, p < .00$; 2010: $\chi^2(78) = 111.66, p = .01$) as well as the Breusch-Pagan test (2006: $\chi^2(1) = 10.45, p < .01$; 2010: $\chi^2(1) = 8.11, p < .01$) were rejected. Therefore, the White-estimator was used in the regression analysis, to make standard errors more robust. For reasons of comparability, this was also done with the COB data. Evidence was not found for multicollinearity problems among the independent and control variables. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) was found in the model with interactions of the DPES 2010 data, but it did not reach higher than 4.3. The residuals in the regression analyses of the COB 2009 data seemed almost perfectly normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test: $p = 0.39$). For the DPES data this was less perfectly the case (2006: Shapiro-Wilk test: $p < 0.01$; 2010: $p < 0.01$); however, plots of the residuals showed that these deviations from normality were not very large, just a little skewed to the left.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1. The infotainment scales ordered from entertaining to informational programs.

COB 2006	H_i	DPES 2006	H_i	DPES 2010	H_i
<i>- Popular news programs with entertaining elements -</i>					
EditieNL	.38	EditieNL	.58	EditieNL	.59
4 In Het Land	.45	Hart van Nederland	.52	Hart van Nederland	.53
Hart van Nederland	.46	RTL Nieuws	.54	RTL Nieuws	.56
RTL Nieuws	.46	NOS Journaal	.43	NOS Journaal	.45
NOS Journaal	.39	Pauw & Witteman	.40	Pauw & Witteman	.45
Pauw & Witteman	.39	EenVandaag	.40	EenVandaag	.48
EenVandaag	.40	Nova	.46	NOVA	.54
Nova	.48	Netwerk	.41	Netwerk	.55
Netwerk	.43				
Buitenhof	.50				
<i>- Informational news programs with serious elements -</i>					
Overall	.43	Overall	.46	Overall	.51

Note. H-values are coefficients of homogeneity.

Table 2. Predictors of political cynicism in 2006, 2009, and 2010.

Variable	DPES 2006			COB 2009			DPES 2010			DPES 2006			COB 2009			DPES 2010		
	<i>b</i>	(<i>SE</i>)	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i>	(<i>SE</i>)	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i>	(<i>SE</i>)	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i>	(<i>SE</i>)	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i>	(<i>SE</i>)	<i>b</i> *	<i>b</i>	(<i>SE</i>)	<i>b</i> *
Constant	46.18***	(2.69)		45.55***	(3.37)		45.97***	(2.94)		46.26***	(2.72)		46.02***	(3.40)		45.45***	(3.16)	
Age	0.17***	(0.03)	.16	0.31***	(0.05)	.24	0.20***	(0.04)	.19	0.17***	(0.03)	.16	0.30***	(0.05)	.24	0.21***	(0.04)	.19
Male	2.49*	(0.97)	.07	3.28*	(1.41)	.09	3.55**	(1.09)	.10	2.44*	(0.97)	.07	3.14*	(1.41)	.08	3.41**	(1.09)	.10
Medium level of education	-4.63**	(1.37)	-.14	-0.75	(1.81)	-.02	-5.95***	(1.50)	-.17	-4.55**	(1.39)	-.14	-0.27	(1.92)	-.01	-5.59***	(1.58)	-.16
High level of education	-7.51***	(1.57)	-.21	-6.83**	(2.24)	-.18	-10.53***	(1.74)	-.29	-7.57***	(1.62)	-.21	-6.56**	(2.33)	-.17	-10.53***	(1.80)	-.29
Medium income	0.05	(1.19)	.00	-0.83	(1.55)	-.02	-0.06	(1.20)	.00	0.07	(1.19)	.00	-0.85	(1.55)	-.02	0.02	(1.20)	.00
High income	-0.83	(1.28)	-.02	-2.13	(1.81)	-.05	-2.11	(1.48)	-.06	-0.73	(1.26)	-.02	-2.36	(1.81)	-.06	-1.99	(1.48)	-.05
Medium politically aware	-3.47**	(1.26)	-.09	-8.17**	(1.47)	-.22	-4.93**	(1.53)	-.13	-3.56**	(1.36)	-.10	-8.43***	(1.49)	-.23	-4.51*	(1.77)	-.12
Most politically aware	-1.62	(1.84)	-.03	-3.96*	(2.01)	-.10	-3.82	(2.08)	-.08	-0.60	(2.22)	-.01	-4.19*	(2.06)	-.10	-1.31	(2.51)	-.03
Internal efficacy	-0.88*	(0.36)	-.08				-1.61***	(0.35)	-.16	-0.89*	(0.36)	-.08				-1.65***	(0.35)	-.16
Read newspaper often	-2.82**	(0.98)	-.08	0.75	(1.53)	.02	-0.76	(1.03)	-.02	-2.87**	(0.97)	-.08	1.37	(1.64)	.03	-0.89	(1.04)	-.02
Reads news often online	0.55	(1.33)	.01	1.80	(1.37)	.05	0.45	(1.11)	.01	0.54	(1.34)	.01	1.86	(1.37)	.05	0.43	(1.10)	.01
TV news program exposure ^a	-3.16***	(0.56)	-.19	-3.31***	(0.72)	-.18	-2.39***	(0.57)	-.13	-2.73	(1.52)	-.16	-2.91	(1.70)	-.16	-2.73	(1.72)	-.15
TV ^a * Regular newspaper										-0.96	(0.95)	-.04	-2.45	(1.59)	-.08	-0.98	(1.01)	-.04
TV ^a * Medium education										0.12	(1.29)	.01	1.87	(1.92)	.07	0.13	(1.43)	.01
TV ^a * High education										0.55	(1.54)	.02	2.55	(2.20)	.08	2.11	(1.50)	.07
TV ^a * Medium aware										0.04	(1.25)	.00	-2.20	(1.48)	-.08	0.66	(1.56)	.03
TV ^a * More aware										-1.88	(2.29)	-.04	-1.29	(1.99)	-.04	-3.31	(2.44)	-.07
Observations (<i>n</i>)	1271			753			1166			1271			753			1166		
R ²	.146			.156			.218			.148			.163			.224		
Adjusted R ²	.138			.144			.210			.136			.144			.213		
AIC	10609.17			6433.46			9716.16			10616.79			6437.95			9716.68		

Note. Low level of education, low income and less politically aware are the reference categories. Cells contain OLS unstandardised (*b*) and standardised (*b**) regression coefficients with robust standard errors (*SE*) in parentheses. ^a z-standardised unfolded scale values, measuring exposure to particular television news programs on television, ranging from popular to serious news programs. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed).

Appendix A: Survey Questions Measuring Political Cynicism

The following five disagree-agree items assessed on five-point scales, were used for the latent scale of political cynicism in the COB 2009 data:

- MPs and ministers do not care much about what people like me think.
- Politicians are particularly interested in their own interest.
- Most politicians are competent people who know what they do. (recoded)
- Politicians spend too much time on discussion, and too little on governing the country.
- Politicians often behave inappropriate to each other.

The following ten agree-disagree items assessed on various scales, were used for the latent scale of political cynicism in the DPES 2006 data:

- MP's do not care about opinions of people like me. (2-point scale; recoded)
- Parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion. (2-point scale; recoded)
- Ministers and junior-ministers are primarily self-interested. (4-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are capable of solving problems in society. (5-point scale)
- Politicians only have fine talk. (5-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are corrupt. (5-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are profiteers. (5-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are reliable. (5-point scale)
- Politicians are honest. (5-point scale)
- Politicians keep their promises. (5-point scale)

The following fifteen agree-disagree items, assessed on various scales, were used for the latent scale of political cynicism in the DPES 2010 data:

- MP's do not care about opinions of people like me. (2-point scale; recoded)

- Parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion. (2-point scale; recoded)
- Ministers and junior-ministers are primarily self-interested. (4-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians promise more than they can deliver. (4-point scale; recoded)
- MP's quickly lose contact with voters. (4-point scale; recoded)
- Friends more important than abilities to become MP. (4-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are capable of solving problems in society. (5-point scale)
- Politicians only have fine talk. (5-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are corrupt. (5-point scale)
- Politicians are profiteers. (5-point scale; recoded)
- Politicians are reliable. (5-point scale)
- Politicians are honest. (5-point scale)
- Politicians keep their promises. (5-point scale)
- Politicians do not understand what is going on in society. (5-point scale; recoded)
- Most politicians are competent people. (5-point scale)

The latent variables were created by the cumulative score of the items in a scale. Individual item values were recoded in such a way that the most cynical response was a score of 4, whereas the least cynical response received a score of 0. In this way, an equal weight was given to every item in the scales.

Appendix B: Sample Characteristics

Table B1. Sample characteristics of the 2006, 2009 and 2010 data.

Variable	<u>DPES 2006</u>		<u>COB 2009</u>		<u>DPES 2010</u>	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Age	47.7	17.0	50.7	16.2	48.6	17.1
Internal efficacy	3.9	1.6			4.0	1.8
	%		%		%	
Male	49.0		42.0		49.0	
Low level of education	24.3		20.6		22.6	
High level of education	24.6		30.4		29.2	
Low income	29.8		49.0		35.0	
High income	35.7		20.5		25.0	
Less politically aware	20.9		30.3		18.9	
More politically aware	12.2		26.2		14.1	
Read newspaper often	56.3		31.3		57.7	
Reads news often online	11.1		39.6		21.0	

Appendix C: Mokken Scales Measuring Political Cynicism*COB 2009*

All item-coefficients of homogeneity were higher than 0.30 (Table F1) and had item specific Z-values higher than 18. The chance was therefore negligible that the overall value for H was 0 in the population ($Z = 41.44$). Also no negative correlations between the items were found. Furthermore, the assumption of double monotony seemed to be accepted as the P^{++} matrix did not indicate any problems (P^{++} matrices are available from author upon request). The matrix showed that the order of difficulty of items was similar in different subgroups, except for some tiny deviations. The distribution of respondents over the various possible cumulative scores also seemed to be well as the distribution showed a good liking normal distribution pattern (Skewness = -0.15, Kurtosis = -0.35). Finally, the values indicated a reliable scale ($\rho = 0.79$).

Table C1. Items in the Mokken scale for political cynicism from the COB survey.

Item	Mean	H_i	Z
Competent	2.06	.45	24.63
Inappropriate	2.20	.31	16.72
Not care much	2.38	.55	30.01
Own interest	2.58	.55	30.06
Discussion	2.86	.54	29.08
Overall		.48	41.44

DPES 2006

All item-coefficients of homogeneity were higher than 0.30 (see Table F2) and had Z-values higher than 30. The chance was thus negligible that the scale did not exist in the whole population ($Z = 85.17$). Moreover, no negative correlations were found between the items and

the assumption of double monotony seemed to be accepted as the P^{++} matrix showed an almost perfect pattern. The order of item difficulty was similar in different subgroups except for a few deviations. The distribution of respondents over the various possible cumulative scores showed to a lesser extent than the 2009 data a good liking normal distribution pattern; though the deviation from a normal distribution was not very large ($M = 18.16$, $SD = 6.69$, $Skewness = 0.47$, $Kurtosis = -0.39$). Finally, the values indicated a reliable scale ($\rho = 0.80$).

Table C2. Items in the Mokken scale for political cynicism from the DPES survey (2006).

Item	Mean	H_i	Z
Do not care	1.35	.41	34.94
Interested in my vote	1.45	.41	35.02
Self-interested	2.25	.39	36.95
Corrupt	2.38	.39	36.13
Profiteers	2.63	.45	42.94
Solving	2.74	.34	32.80
Fine talk	2.94	.45	42.57
Reliable	2.97	.48	43.65
Honest	3.06	.45	41.51
Promises	3.43	.40	37.39
Overall		.42	85.17

DPES 2010

All item-coefficients of homogeneity were higher than 0.30 (Table F3) and had Z-values higher than 40; the chance was thus negligible that the scale did not exist in the whole population ($Z = 156.61$). Furthermore, negative correlations were not found between the various items. The assumption of double monotony seemed to be accepted as the P^{++} matrix in general reflected the perfect pattern; the order of difficulty of items was similar in different

subgroups, except for a few deviations. The distribution of respondents over the various possible cumulative scores was also fine ($M = 28.14$, $SD = 9.47$, $Skewness = 0.53$, $Kurtosis = -0.40$). Finally, the values indicated a reliable scale ($\rho = 0.89$).

Table C3. Items in the Mokken scale for political cynicism from the DPES survey (2010).

Item	Mean	H_i	Z
Do not care	0.32	.43	52.98
Only in my vote interested	0.47	.50	60.71
Corrupt	1.08	.42	55.43
Self-interest	1.38	.50	67.94
Competent	1.45	.41	55.12
Friends more important	1.45	.41	55.81
Understand society	1.62	.45	63.22
Profiteers	1.62	.47	65.45
Lost contact	1.76	.46	55.85
Solve problems	1.83	.36	49.59
Reliable	1.86	.47	62.11
Fine talk	1.88	.49	67.69
Honest	2.17	.43	57.11
Promise too much	2.19	.34	43.99
Keep promises	2.45	.39	51.62
Overall		.44	156.61

Appendix D: Unfolding Scales Measuring News Genre Exposure

COB survey 2009

Next to the *H*-value, the conditional adjacency matrix also indicated a rather good fit in the COB 2009 data. This matrix shows the percentage of respondents that gives positive responses to both items related to a cell, relative to the number of respondents giving a positive answer to the row item. In a perfect unfolding scale, values would increase coming closer to the diagonal (that are adjacent items) and decrease when the combination of items is further away from the diagonal. Except for some small deviations, the adjacency matrix did not indicate huge deviations from this (Table G1). Trace lines indicating the probability to watch a certain program for respondents with a certain scale value, also pointed to a rather good fit. Seven of the programs had a single peaked form, only one had a clear second peak, which was *RTL Nieuws*; *Hart van Nederland* and *EditieNL* had a negligibly small second peak. The correlation matrix confirmed that the scale fitted the data well. Though there were quite some deviations, most were small, and the sign of the correlations never changed two times (from positive to negative and to positive again) (Table G2).

Table D1. Conditional adjacency matrix (COB 2009).

	Editie NL	4 In Het Land	Hart van NL	RTL Nieuws	NOS Journaal	Pauw & Witteman	Een Vandaag	Nova	Net- werk	Buiten- hof
EditieNL	-	41	24	<u>26</u>	17	16	<u>17</u>	13	<u>16</u>	14
4 In Het Land	34	-	25	22	15	14	12	<u>13</u>	13	12
Hart van NL	65	82	-	58	48	44	43	36	<u>39</u>	32
RTL Nieuws	92	91	<u>75</u>	-	63	59	<u>60</u>	57	<u>59</u>	51
NOS Journaal	78	83	84	86	-	<u>94</u>	98	98	97	97
Pauw & Witteman	40	41	40	42	50	-	64	<u>68</u>	62	<u>75</u>
EenVandaag	<u>30</u>	26	28	31	37	46	-	<u>53</u>	59	58
Nova	30	35	<u>30</u>	36	46	61	66	-	72	<u>82</u>
Netwerk	27	27	25	29	35	43	<u>57</u>	55	-	59
Buitenhof	12	<u>12</u>	10	12	17	25	28	<u>31</u>	29	-

Note. Deviations are underlined

Table D2. The correlation matrix (COB 2009).

	Editie NL	4 In Het Land	Hart van NL	RTL Nieuws	NOS Journaal	Pauw & Witteman	Een Vandaag	Nova	Net- werk	Buiten- hof
EditieNL	1									
4 In Het Land	.24	1								
Hart van NL	.13	.27	1							
RTL Nieuws	<u>.27</u>	<u>.23</u>	.20	1						
NOS Journaal	-.18	-.09	<u>-.18</u>	-.18	1					
Pauw & Witteman	<u>-.07</u>	-.06	-.14	-.15	.15	1				
EenVandaag	-.05	<u>-.07</u>	-.12	<u>-.10</u>	<u>.19</u>	.24	1			
Nova	-.13	<u>-.07</u>	-.25	-.17	<u>.24</u>	<u>.36</u>	.35	1		
Netwerk	<u>-.06</u>	-.05	<u>-.17</u>	<u>-.11</u>	.16	.21	.37	.41	1	
Buitenhof	-.05	<u>-.04</u>	-.16	-.15	.11	.23	.23	<u>.35</u>	.25	1

Note. Deviations are underlined, no double sign changes

DPES 2006 and 2010

Whereas the *H*-values indicated a rather good fit, the conditional adjacency matrix and the correlation matrix both showed some deviations from the perfect pattern (increasing values when closer to the diagonal) (Tables G3, G4, G5 and G6). Though in general the trend was obvious that values increased the more adjacent itmes were. Most of the deviations seemed to be caused by *EditieNL* and *Nova* (DPES 2006) and *EditieNL* and *Netwerk* (DPES 2010).

These were more popular than expected with viewers located on the other side of the spectrum. This phenomenon may be explained disturbing underlying dimensions as the time people watch television or the habit to watch a particular channel. Furthermore, a reason for the deviations may be that the peaks of many item trace lines were located very close to each other and at the extremes of the unidimensional scale. However, none of those had a double peak. Therefore, and because of the high *H*-value, the scales seemed to represent the underlying infotainment dimension properly.

Table D3. Conditional adjacency matrix (DPES 2006).

	EditieNL	Hart van Nederland	RTL Nieuws	NOS Journaal	Pauw & Witte man	Een Vandaag	Nova	Netwerk
EditieNL	-	19	18	6	7	<u>14</u>	10	<u>14</u>
Hart van Nederland	45	-	34	14	16	<u>22</u>	14	<u>20</u>
RTL Nieuws	<u>69</u>	56	-	<u>29</u>	36	37	37	37
NOS Journaal	32	34	41	-	71	<u>76</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>80</u>
Pauw & Witteman	8	8	10	14	-	31	<u>41</u>	30
EenVandaag	<u>12</u>	8	8	12	24	-	<u>31</u>	42
Nova	<u>10</u>	6	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>37</u>	36	-	49
Netwerk	<u>9</u>	5	6	9	17	31	31	-

Note. Deviations are underlined

Table D4. The correlation matrix (DPES 2006).

	EditieNL	Hart van Nederland	RTL Nieuws	NOS Journaal	Pauw & Witteman	Een Vandaag	Nova	Netwerk
EditieNL	1							
Hart van Nederland	.34	1						
RTL Nieuws	<u>.44</u>	.40	1					
NOS Journaal	<u>-.10</u>	-.17	<u>-.05</u>	1				
Pauw & Witteman	<u>.02</u> *	<u>-.08</u>	.05*	.34	1			
EenVandaag	<u>.15</u> *	-.00	.08	.31	<u>.40</u>	1		
Nova	<u>-.01</u> *	-.12	.00	<u>.42</u>	.59	<u>.49</u>	1	
Netwerk	.06*	<u>-.02</u>	<u>.04</u>	.34	.37	.49	.54	1

Note. Deviations are underlined, double sign changes (positive to negative to positive) are indicated with a *

Table D5. Conditional adjacency matrix (DPES 2010).

	EditieNL	Hart van Nederland	RTL Nieuws	NOS Journaal	Pauw & Witteman	EenVandaag	Nova	Netwerk
EditieNL	-	15	<u>22</u>	<u>4</u>	11	13	7	7
Hart van Nederland	38	-	30	14	14	<u>22</u>	7	<u>14</u>
RTL Nieuws	<u>67</u>	36	-	17	<u>24</u>	<u>32</u>	22	21
NOS Journaal	24	37	37	-	65	<u>77</u>	<u>94</u>	<u>93</u>
Pauw & Witteman	<u>20</u>	9	14	17	-	33	35	34
EenVandaag	<u>16</u>	11	13	14	23	-	39	<u>56</u>
Nova	<u>8</u>	3	9	17	23	38	-	61
Netwerk	<u>7</u>	5	7	13	18	<u>44</u>	48	-

Note. Deviations are underlined

Table D6. The correlation matrix (DPES 2010).

	EditieNL	Hart van Nederland	RTL Nieuws	NOS Journaal	Pauw & Witte man	EenVandaag	Nova	Netwerk
EditieNL	1.00							
Hart van Nederland	.34	1.00						
RTL Nieuws	<u>.47</u>	.38	1.00					
NOS Journaal	-.20	-.15	-.10	1.00				
Pauw & Witte man	<u>.01*</u>	<u>-.04</u>	<u>.04*</u>	.35	1.00			
EenVandaag	<u>.06*</u>	-.01	<u>.08</u>	<u>.40</u>	.41	1.00		
Nova	<u>-.07</u>	-.16	-.02	<u>.52</u>	<u>.55</u>	.53	1.00	
Netwerk	-.04	<u>-.11</u>	-.02	<u>.47</u>	.40	<u>.58</u>	.66	1.00

Note. Deviations are underlined, double sign changes (positive to negative, to positive) are indicated with a *